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Boethius

Boethius, a philosopher and statesman of the late Roman Empire, lived from 480 to 524 AD and made significant contributions to medieval philosophy and literature. His most renowned work, "The Consolation of Philosophy," presents a profound exploration of the nature of fate, happiness, and the existence of God. Combining elements of Stoicism and Christian thought, Boethius examines the human condition, seeking solace and wisdom in the face of adversity. His writings continue to inspire readers, offering timeless insights into the complexities of life and the pursuit of meaning.

15 Notes

480 - 524

Rome, Italy

Discuss

Thomas Aquinas(1225 - 1274)

Boethius says (Hebdom., the title of which is: "Whether all that is, is good"), "that there are some mental concepts self evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in space." Therefore, I say that this proposition, "God exists," of itself is self-evident,

Book & Page: Aquinas pdf p.790

#Quotes

It seems that goodness differs really from being. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "I perceive that in nature the fact that
things are good is one thing: that they are is another." Therefore goodness and being really differ.

Book & Page: Aquinas pdf p.826

#Quotes

It seems that God is not eternal. For nothing made can be predicated of God; for Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "The now
that flows away makes time, the now that stands still makes eternity;"

Book & Page: Aquinas pdf p. 5231

#Quotes

It seems that God is not eternal. For nothing made can be predicated of God; for Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "The now
that flows away makes time, the now that stands still makes eternity;"

Book & Page: Aquinas pdf p. 1181

#Quotes

For Boethius says (De Trin.): "Whatever is predicated of God, of whatever genus it is, becomes the divine substance, except what pertains to the relation." But action is one of the ten "genera." Therefore, any action attributed to God belongs to His essence, and not to a notion.

Book & Page: Aquinas pdf p. 1364

#Quotes

Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6), that intellect is compared to reason, as eternity to time. But it does not belong to the same power to be in eternity and to be in time. Therefore reason and intellect are not the same power.

Book & Page: Aquinas pdf p. 1904

#Quotes

Further, Boethius says (De Consol. v, 4) that "sense considers man in one way, imagination in another, reason in another, intelligence in another." But intellect is the same power as reason. Therefore, seemingly, intelligence is a distinct power from intellect, as reason is a distinct power from imagination or sense.

Book & Page: Aquinas pdf p. 1909

#Quotes

Further, Boethius (De Consol. iii) says of God: "Holding the world in His mind, and forming it into His image." Therefore, the whole world is in the image of God, and not only the rational creature.

Book & Page: Aquinas pdf p. 2101

#Quotes

Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "There is nothing that can desire or is able to resist this sovereign good. It is this sovereign good therefore that rules all mightily and ordered all sweetly," as is said (Wis. 8) of Divine wisdom.

Book & Page: Aquinas pdf p. 2218

#Quotes

It seems that all things are subject to fate. For Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "The chain of fate moves the heaven and the stars, tempers the elements to one another, and models them by a reciprocal transformation. By fate, all things that are born into the world and perish are renewed in a uniform progression of offspring and seed." Nothing therefore seems to be excluded from the domain of fate.

Book & Page: Aquinas pdf p. 2394

#Quotes

Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii), happiness is "a state of life made perfect by the aggregate of all good things."

Book & Page: Aquinas pdf p. 2451

#Quotes

Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "Anyone that chooses to look back on his past excesses, will perceive that pleasures had a sad ending: and if they can render a man happy, there is no reason why we should not say that the very beasts are happy too."

Book & Page: Aquinas pdf p. 2462

#Quotes

Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But state does not indicate operation. Therefore, happiness is not an operation.

Book & Page: Aquinas pdf p. 2473

#Quotes

It seems that the definition of eternity given by Boethius (De Consol. v) is not a good one: "Eternity is the simultaneously whole and perfect possession of interminable life." For the word "interminable" is a negative one. But negation only belongs to what is defective, and this does not belong to eternity. Therefore, in the definition of eternity the word "interminable" ought not to be found.

Book & Page: Aquinas pdf p.877

#Disagree

It would seem that the definition of person given by Boethius (De Duab. Nat.) is insufficient---that is, "a person is an individual substance of a rational nature." For nothing singular can be subject to definition. But "person" signifies something singular.
Therefore, person is improperly defined.

Book & Page: Aquinas pdf p. 1215

#Disagree

Thomas Aquinas(1225 - 1274)

Boethius says (Hebdom., the title of which is: "Whether all that is, is good"), "that there are some mental concepts self evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in space." Therefore, I say that this proposition, "God exists," of itself is self-evident,

Book & Page: Aquinas pdf p.790

#Quotes

It seems that goodness differs really from being. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "I perceive that in nature the fact that
things are good is one thing: that they are is another." Therefore goodness and being really differ.

Book & Page: Aquinas pdf p.826

#Quotes

It seems that God is not eternal. For nothing made can be predicated of God; for Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "The now
that flows away makes time, the now that stands still makes eternity;"

Book & Page: Aquinas pdf p. 5231

#Quotes

It seems that God is not eternal. For nothing made can be predicated of God; for Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "The now
that flows away makes time, the now that stands still makes eternity;"

Book & Page: Aquinas pdf p. 1181

#Quotes

For Boethius says (De Trin.): "Whatever is predicated of God, of whatever genus it is, becomes the divine substance, except what pertains to the relation." But action is one of the ten "genera." Therefore, any action attributed to God belongs to His essence, and not to a notion.

Book & Page: Aquinas pdf p. 1364

#Quotes

Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6), that intellect is compared to reason, as eternity to time. But it does not belong to the same power to be in eternity and to be in time. Therefore reason and intellect are not the same power.

Book & Page: Aquinas pdf p. 1904

#Quotes

Further, Boethius says (De Consol. v, 4) that "sense considers man in one way, imagination in another, reason in another, intelligence in another." But intellect is the same power as reason. Therefore, seemingly, intelligence is a distinct power from intellect, as reason is a distinct power from imagination or sense.

Book & Page: Aquinas pdf p. 1909

#Quotes

Further, Boethius (De Consol. iii) says of God: "Holding the world in His mind, and forming it into His image." Therefore, the whole world is in the image of God, and not only the rational creature.

Book & Page: Aquinas pdf p. 2101

#Quotes

Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "There is nothing that can desire or is able to resist this sovereign good. It is this sovereign good therefore that rules all mightily and ordered all sweetly," as is said (Wis. 8) of Divine wisdom.

Book & Page: Aquinas pdf p. 2218

#Quotes

It seems that all things are subject to fate. For Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "The chain of fate moves the heaven and the stars, tempers the elements to one another, and models them by a reciprocal transformation. By fate, all things that are born into the world and perish are renewed in a uniform progression of offspring and seed." Nothing therefore seems to be excluded from the domain of fate.

Book & Page: Aquinas pdf p. 2394

#Quotes

Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii), happiness is "a state of life made perfect by the aggregate of all good things."

Book & Page: Aquinas pdf p. 2451

#Quotes

Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "Anyone that chooses to look back on his past excesses, will perceive that pleasures had a sad ending: and if they can render a man happy, there is no reason why we should not say that the very beasts are happy too."

Book & Page: Aquinas pdf p. 2462

#Quotes

Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But state does not indicate operation. Therefore, happiness is not an operation.

Book & Page: Aquinas pdf p. 2473

#Quotes
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Thomas Aquinas(1225 - 1274)

It seems that the definition of eternity given by Boethius (De Consol. v) is not a good one: "Eternity is the simultaneously whole and perfect possession of interminable life." For the word "interminable" is a negative one. But negation only belongs to what is defective, and this does not belong to eternity. Therefore, in the definition of eternity the word "interminable" ought not to be found.

Book & Page: Aquinas pdf p.877

#Disagree

It would seem that the definition of person given by Boethius (De Duab. Nat.) is insufficient---that is, "a person is an individual substance of a rational nature." For nothing singular can be subject to definition. But "person" signifies something singular.
Therefore, person is improperly defined.

Book & Page: Aquinas pdf p. 1215

#Disagree
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No notes yet...
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